




Length of Stay in
For-Profit and
Not-for-Profit Hospitals
The issue of differential quality in for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NFP) hospitals
remains a critical health policy question. With research demonstrating a relationship
between nurse staffing and quality, the question arises whether the relationship differs in
these hospital types. Using Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project data from the
period 1990–1995, we found that case mix-adjusted registered nurse (RN) staffing was
significantly lower in FPs than in NFPs, and we found a superior distribution of
outcomes (mortality and length of stay) obtained with a lower level of RN staffing. The
differences in mortality and length of stay disappeared, however, after controlling for
population and market characteristics.
In the early to mid-1990s, acute care hospitals
were buffeted by dramatic changes in their
operating environments because of the in-
creasing dominance of managed care, market
responses to industry overcapacity, more
stringent Medicare reimbursement policy,
new technology development, and demands
for shorter lengths of stay. Hospitals reacted by
introducing a range of strategies aimed at
improving the efficiency of their internal
operations. In view of the fact that expendi-
tures for nursing personnel comprise a signifi-
cant portion of the hospital budget (Kovner et
al. 2002), it is not surprising that in an attempt
to reduce labor costs and improve efficiency
hospitals also re-engineered and re-designed
clinical care processes, which frequently re-
sulted in changes in nurse staffing (ANA 1995).
Because of the different incentives in for-
profit hospitals (FPs) and not-for-profit
hospitals (NFPs), the transformation of
hospital care during this time period renewed
policy debates regarding the social utility of
for-profit hospitals. The debate continues
today, with the House Ways and Means
Committee recently holding hearings on the
appropriateness of granting tax-exempt non-
profit status to hospitals (Commonwealth
Fund 2005). Proponents suggest that FPs
can facilitate health coverage of the un-
insured, generate more tax revenue for the
government, free resources from acute care
for public health services, and enhance
a hospital’s ability to access capital. Oppo-
nents suggest that FPs will increase prices,
lower quality, be less likely to accept un-
profitable patients, and fail to provide ade-
quate community benefits because their
objective is to maximize shareholder profit
(Gray 1997; Schlesinger and Gray 2006).
The confluence of several policy issues
raises the question whether hospitals with
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different ownership structures produce care
of equal quality with the same number of, or
fewer, nurses. These issues include ongoing
concerns about hospitals’ profit or tax-
exempt nonprofit status, potential disparities
in quality in the two types of hospitals,
a significant nursing shortage (Buerhaus,
Staiger, and Auerbach 2004), and emerging
nurse staffing research about the contribution
of nursing to improved quality of care
(Kovner et al. 2002; Needleman et al. 2002;
Mark et al. 2004).
If the profit motive spurs efficiency con-
cerns to a greater degree in FPs than in NFPs,
and these concerns play out in operational
changes in the staffing and deployment of
nurses providing care in the hospital setting,
there may be significant consequences for
how hospitals develop strategies to recruit,
retain, and use nurses. In addition, if the
relationship between nurse staffing and qual-
ity differs significantly in FP and NFP
hospitals, then states considering legislation
mandating minimum nurse staffing regula-
tions should account for differences in owner-
ship type in the ratios to be proposed. There
also may be implications for national-level
policy decisions about aggregate supply and
demand for nurses, and strategies to address
the shortage of nurses.
Thus, our paper examines whether FP and
NFP hospitals differ in their nurse staffing,
their mortality (e.g., death during hospital-
ization), and their length of stay (e.g., number
of days hospitalized). We examine the distri-
bution of staffing and outcomes (mortality
and length of stay) in FP and NFP hospitals
in 1990 and 1995. Data from these years are
particularly relevant to understanding poten-
tial differences in responses by FPs and NFPs
to a significant structural change in the health
care environment: the rapid growth of man-
aged care penetration (Jensen et al. 1997;
Marquis and Long 1999).
Background
Staffing in For-Profit and Not-for-
Profit Hospitals
The evidence concerning differential staffing
in FPs and NFPs is not conclusive. In-
vestigating the effects of ownership conver-
sion is one avenue for examining this ques-
tion. Mark (1999) examined the effects of
conversions on changes in hospital staffing
between 1989 and 1992; she found that in
NFP to FP conversions, total staff-to-patient
ratios decreased significantly, but the decline
in nurse staffing was not statistically signifi-
cant. In contrast, she found that when FPs
converted to NFP status, both registered
nurse (RN)-to-patient ratios and administra-
tor-to-patient ratios increased, and the in-
creases were statistically significant. A Com-
monwealth Fund report (Hadley, Gray, and
Collins 2001) found that in hospitals convert-
ing from FP to NFP status between 1985 and
1993, total full-time equivalent (FTE) staff
(nurse staffing was not identified separately)
grew significantly more slowly in the three
years pre-conversion than in a matched set of
hospitals that did not convert; the differences
in staffing were not significant in either the
three- or five-year post-conversion period.
Picone, Chou, and Sloan (2002) found that
in conversions to FP status, real wages and
salaries (of which a significant portion was
nurse wages) fell substantially during the
conversion year, but cuts were partially
restored in subsequent years. A similar
pattern was found for wages and salaries
per adjusted patient day. While conversions
to NFP status also resulted in a drop in wages
and salaries during the conversion year, the
decrease was not nearly as large as in
hospitals that converted to FP status. More
recently, Shen (2003) used panel data to
examine ownership conversions and found
that hospitals converting to FP status reduced
registered nurses per hospital bed by 13.5%,
and licensed practical nurses (LPNs) per
hospital bed by 10.25%. In contrast, conver-
sion to NFP status did not change the RN-to-
bed ratio, although LPNs per hospital bed
were reduced by 17.5%.
Finally, Spetz, Seago, and Mitchell (2003)
used a fixed-effects model, controlling for
wages, patient days, case mix, service mix,
percentage of county discharges insured by
a health maintenance organization (HMO),
and year, to investigate the impact on staffing
of ownership conversion in 219 California
hospitals. They found that conversions from
NFP to FP status were associated with
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declines in RN staffing, but the changes were
not statistically significant. In contrast, while
conversions from FP to NFP ownership were
associated with increases in RN staffing, the
increases were not statistically significant.
Another set of studies has made direct
comparisons between FPs and NFPs in
staffing, rather than investigating the effects
of ownership conversions on staffing. Carter,
Massa, and Power (1997) compared 185
Texas hospitals and found support for their
hypothesis that FPs would exhibit less ‘‘ex-
pense preference behavior’’ by utilizing fewer
full-time or FTE employees, a finding that
held regardless of possible economies of scale
(number of hospital beds). Shukla, Pestian,
and Clement (1997) compared the economic
performance of FPs and NFPs, and reported
that labor cost was higher but paid hours per
admission were lower in FP hospitals, which
paid more in both salary and benefits than
did NFPs. Seago, Spetz, and Mitchell (2004),
in a study making direct comparisons among
California hospitals of different ownership
types, found that independent FPs had the
highest RN hours per day and highest RN-to-
patient ratios, and the richest skill mix of any
ownership type. However, in multivariate
regressions, FPs, particularly those that were
part of multihospital systems, used fewer RN
hours to care for medical-surgical patients.
Interestingly, when Seago and colleagues
included dummy variables to distinguish
urban FPs from their rural FP counterparts,
FPs were no longer significantly different
from other hospitals. The authors’ explana-
tion is that most independent FP hospitals in
California are located in rural areas and need
to maintain a minimum number of RN hours
even if there are no patients in the facility.
The findings of the studies reviewed here
suggest that conversion to FP status may
result in reduced registered nurse staffing;
similarly, the comparison studies indicate that
FPs may use fewer RNs. However, defini-
tional differences in measuring nurse staffing,
as well as the inclusion of RNs within other
employee and wage categories, render con-
clusive statements difficult. In addition, with
the exception of the studies by Spetz, Seago,
and Mitchell (2003; Seago, Spetz, and Mitch-
ell 2004), none of the studies reported here
has directly examined differential nurse staff-
ing by ownership type. Moreover, the gener-
alizability of the discussed studies is limited
because of their focus on one state, and by the
likely conflation of ownership status and
rural location. The lack of definitive conclu-
sions about different staffing levels in FP and
NFP hospitals highlights the need for more
detailed studies of nurse staffing.
Mortality and Length of Stay in For-Profit
and Not-for-Profit Hospitals
There is also a substantial, but inconclusive
body of research on quality differences
between FPs and NFPs. Conceptual and
methodological diversity—use of disparate
clinical conditions, risk models, selection of
outcomes and the timing of their measure-
ment, data sets, and analytic approaches
relying on widely varying assumptions—
contribute to the lack of clarity on the issue.
As with the research on staffing, some studies
have investigated mortality and length of stay
differences between FPs and NFPs, while
others have examined the effects of hospital
ownership conversions on mortality and
length of stay.
One reason earlier comparative studies of
mortality rates in FPs and NFPs are in-
conclusive is that they were cross-sectional,
used data collected before the time of
burgeoning managed care penetration, and
did not have a specific focus on ownership
status.1 More recent studies, however, using
methods that account for potential sources of
bias, highlight the difficulty in addressing the
issue. For example, three recent studies found
complex relationships between ownership and
mortality after ownership conversions. Using
data from the National Long-Term Care
Survey, Picone, Chou and Sloan (2002)
examined 30-day mortality and found that
converting from government or nonprofit
status to for-profit status increased mortality
for one or two years following conversion,
after which the increase in mortality rates was
less steep. Whether the same findings would
hold for inpatient mortality is a question of
importance since much of the research on the
relationship between nurse staffing and mor-
tality has focused on inpatient rather than 30-
day mortality. More difficult causal issues are
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raised when examining an outcome (mortal-
ity) at some temporal distance from the
intervention (nurse staffing). Farsi (2004),
using data on Medicare patients in hospitals
that changed ownership in California, found
that conversion in either direction (i.e., NFP
to FP, or vice versa) had adverse effects:
hospitals that converted to FP status had
increased inpatient myocardial infarction
mortality rates, while those that converted
to NFP ownership had increased mortality
for patients with congestive heart failure.
However, in a study on mergers and acquisi-
tions in California, Ho and Hamilton (2000)
found no difference in inpatient mortality
among either heart attack or stroke patients,
although the authors caution against strong
conclusions because the estimates were mea-
sured imprecisely.
Research also has been inconclusive about
differences in length of stay (LOS) between
FPs and NFPs. For example, Burns and
Wholey (1991) found that LOS was longer for
patients in investor-owned hospitals across 11
medical and five surgical conditions. Howev-
er, the focus of this study was not specifically
on ownership; ownership was one of many
hospital characteristics included in the ana-
lytic model. In addition, the data were from
1988, prior to the period of rapid managed
care growth. Anders (1993), in a comparative
study of administrative delays in one FP and
one NFP, found no difference in length of
stay. More recently, Yuan et al. (2000) found
that, when compared with several other
ownership types (public teaching hospitals
and NFP teaching hospitals), FPs had the
shortest length of stay. A strength of this
study was its sample size (more than 5,100
acute care hospitals), but it was limited only
to Medicare patients hospitalized for 10
common medical and 10 common surgical
conditions. Thus, generalizability is a concern.
Nurse Staffing, Mortality, and Length of Stay
To further complicate the confused relation-
ships among nurse staffing, quality of care,
and ownership type, there is also ambiguity
about whether higher levels of nurse staffing
are associated with higher quality of care.
Several early studies examining the relation-
ships between hospital characteristics and
mortality that tangentially included nurse
staffing as a hospital characteristic found
that higher levels of nurse staffing were
associated with reduced mortality (Scott,
Forrest, and Brown 1976; Hartz et al. 1989;
Kuhn et al. 1991; Manheim et al. 1992).
However, another study found no significant
relationship between nurse staffing and mor-
tality (Al-Haider and Wan 1991). More
recent studies have found that hospitals with
high nurse-to-bed ratios had lower than
expected mortality rates (Silber et al. 1995;
Silber, Rosenbaum, and Ross 1995). And
several studies that have had the relationship
between nurse staffing and mortality as their
primary focus have found ‘‘better’’ nurse
staffing associated with lower in-hospital
mortality (Aiken et al. 2002; Mark et al.
2004), although Needleman et al. (2002)
found no relationship to mortality. Four
studies have provided support for the re-
lationship between higher levels of nurse
staffing and shorter length of stay (ANA
1997, 2000; Lichtig, Knauf, and Milholland
1999; Mark, Harless, and McCue 2005;
Needleman et al. 2002).
In summary, the research reviewed here
remains ambiguous with regard to differences
between FP and NFP hospitals in terms of
nurse staffing, mortality, and length of stay.
However, the literature does suggest a benefi-
cial effect of nurse staffing on mortality and
length of stay. To date, there has been no
research that specifically examines nurse staff-
ing, mortality, and length of stay in for-profit
and not-for-profit hospitals during a period of
time of major upheaval in hospital environ-
ments; that is the purpose of our study.
Approach
Theoretical approaches to understanding
differences in hospital behavior suggest that
such differences arise from differential claims
on ‘‘wealth’’ as a consequence of different
forms of ownership. The early theoretical
work of Modigliani and Miller (1958) sug-
gests that an investor-owned (or for-profit)
firm is a wealth-maximizing entity that seeks
out investment projects that increase the
wealth of its stockholders. Somewhat later,
the major theories of hospital behavior (New-
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house 1970; Pauly and Redisch 1973) sug-
gested that NFP hospitals were assumed to be
utility maximizing (Newhouse 1970), while
FP hospitals were assumed to be profit
maximizing. Ever since, there has been
controversy about whether NFPs and FPs
behave differently, with Pauly and Redisch
(1973) calling NFPs ‘‘for-profit firms in
disguise’’ and Wheeler and Clement (1990)
arguing for a ‘‘for-profit’’ view of NFPs.
If NFPs are ‘‘for-profit firms in disguise,’’
we expect that the increased competition in
hospital markets due to burgeoning managed
care penetration caused the differences that
may have existed between FPs and NFPs in
1990 to have lessened by 1995. In particular,
we expect that NFPs may have imitated FPs’
staffing strategies in order to be successful.
To control for systematic differences in the
location of FP hospitals compared to NFP
hospitals and the potential impact of location
on outcomes, we also compare the distribu-
tions of outcomes after controlling for
population and market characteristics.
Kernel Density Estimates
Rather than estimate a parametric model of
quality and staffing levels comparing FP and
NFP hospitals, we use a nonparametric
approach in which we compare the distribu-
tions of staffing and outcomes at FP and
NFP hospitals. We use visual representations
based on kernel density estimates—a tech-
nique not commonly applied in health ser-
vices research and, to our knowledge, not yet
applied in the literature on FP and NFP
hospitals. The statistical tests of the distribu-
tions are the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and Epps
and Singleton (1986) tests.
Like a histogram, kernel density estimates
approximate the distribution or density of
a variable from a sample. But kernel density
estimate assumptions are less restrictive than
those for a histogram (Fox 1990; DiNardo and
Tobias 2001). A histogram has nonoverlap-
ping bins, and the height of the bar for a bin
estimates the probability density at the bin
center, putting equal weight on each observa-
tion in the bin regardless of the distance from
the bin center. Hence, the appearance of the
histogram depends on the location of the bin
centers, which are determined by the choice of
bin width and location of the first bin. Kernel
density estimates are different because bins are
allowed to ‘‘overlap’’ (so bin centers are not
determined by bin width), and different
weights are put on observations depending
on the nearness to the point at which the
density is being estimated (DiNardo and
Tobias 2001).
The kernel density estimates are then
augmented by two statistical tests for differ-
ences in distributions: the Kolmogorov-Smir-
nov test (Conover 1999) and the Epps-
Singleton test (1986). Rather than a test for
differences in means (or conditional means),
these are omnibus tests for any difference in
the shape of the distribution—location, dis-
persion, skewness, and so on (Hollander and
Wolfe 1999; Sachs 1984). The two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is based on com-
paring the maximum vertical distance in the
two empirical cumulative distribution func-
tions. The Epps-Singleton test is based on the
empirical characteristic functions for the two
samples. The consequence of the generality of
these tests is that they are less powerful than
a test specific to one aspect of a distribution
(e.g., location). Nevertheless, these are the
sharpest tests for homogeneity of two dis-
tributions (Sachs 1984) and are the most
appropriate for our purposes given our




The Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project
(HCUP) National Inpatient Sample (NIS) is
an all-payer database, including a 20% prob-
ability sample of U.S. community hospitals,
stratified by ownership/control, number of
beds, teaching status, urban/rural location
and U.S. region. Each year, approximately
900 hospitals are included; 422 hospitals were
included in each of our study years (1990
through 1995). These 422 hospitals, known as
the HCUP longitudinal cohort, comprise 49%
of the HCUP base-year sample. Hospitals are
located in 11 states (Arizona, California,
Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Massachu-




From the 422 hospitals in our initial
sample, we eliminated 12 hospitals that
switched ownership status in the 1990–1995
period, and eliminated another six hospitals
due to the inability to match them across all
data sets. Two additional hospitals were
eliminated because their data were for a sys-
tem rather than an individual hospital, and
two others were dropped because revenue
information was missing from all files from
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS). Hospitals with staffing out-
liers also were excluded. Additional exclu-
sions were for hospitals with fewer than 15
expected mortalities (Mark et al. 2004). These
exclusions resulted in a sample of 48 FP
hospitals and 268 NFPs in 1990, and 44 FPs
and 266 NFPs in 1995. Although this small
sample is a limitation of our study, the two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Epps-
Singleton tests are often applied with sample
sizes considerably smaller than ours (e.g.,
Arnon et al. [2006] applied the two-sample
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with sample sizes
for the groups as small as 11 and 17). In
addition, the limitation of the small sample is
somewhat offset by the fact that we have
observations on these hospitals over a six-
year period of time, and while the results we
report use data from 1990 and 1995, they are
essentially similar in other years (results
available upon request from the authors).
In 1995, our sample of 310 hospitals was
85% NFP (70% private NFP, 15% public)
and 13% FP (with 2% unknown), compared
to national figures of 85% NFP (58% private
NFP, 27% public) and 15% for-profit (AHA
1995). Hospitals in our sample were some-
what larger (206 beds vs. 170 beds for U.S.
hospitals) and treated a somewhat more
complex mix of patients (case-mix index
1.36 vs. 1.23 for U.S. hospitals). Average
HMO penetration (measured as HMO en-
rollment as a percentage of total hospital
service area [HSA] population) in our sample
in 1995 was 22.5%, somewhat greater than
the 16% in hospitals nationwide (Baker
2001), and the range in our sample (0% to
60.4%) was nearly as large as the national
range (0% to 73%). Thus, although there are
some differences, our final sample reflects the
overall population of U.S. hospitals.
Data
Data sources included the Area Resource
Files, the American Hospital Association
(AHA) Annual Survey, the Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS,
formerly the Health Care Financing Admin-
istration) Minimum Cost and Capital File,
the CMS Wage Rate File, the CMS Provider
of Services File, the CMS Case Mix Index
File, the CMS Online Survey Certification
and Reporting system (OSCAR) files, and
HCUP files.
Measures
Table 1 provides definitions and data sources
of all variables; in most cases, measurement is
straightforward. Complete descriptions of the
variables and their measurement can be
found in Mark et al. (2004) and Mark,
Harless, and McCue (2005). Here we provide
a brief description of selected variables.
Ownership. We classified hospitals, based
on AHA data, as to whether they were for-
profit or not-for-profit.
Mortality and length of stay. From HCUP
data, we determined whether a patient died
during the hospital stay (inpatient mortality)
and then totaled the actual number of deaths
for a hospital in the calendar year. Ho and
Hamilton (2000) point out that using in-
patient mortality is subject to possible bias by
the fact that it is censored by live discharge.
Mortality might be lower in FPs than in
NFPs if FPs discharge patients earlier and
perhaps to other institutions (e.g., long-term
care facilities) where they then die. Thus, 30-
day mortality rates might be a better in-
dicator of hospital quality. Two issues argue
against this approach, however. First, the
HCUP data only report inpatient mortality.
Second, mortality after discharge is likely to
be confounded with post-discharge treat-
ment, and perhaps be less sensitive to the
delivery of hospital care. In order to partly
account for possible differences in discharge
practices of FP hospitals, we exclude from
our analysis patients who were discharged to
another facility or who had other ‘‘non-
routine’’ discharges.3
Risk adjustment for mortality and length
of stay measures was performed using Med-
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stat’s Disease Staging methodology (Gon-
nella, Hornbrook, and Louis 1984), which
can be directly applied to HCUP data.
Diseases are ‘‘staged’’ into four substages
(no complications through death) from Uni-
form Billing (UB)-82/UB-92 information,
which includes the patient’s age, gender,
admission type, admission source, and type
of treatment (medical vs. surgical). This
information is used to derive a predicted
probability of death and expected length of
stay. For our study, the disease staging
methodology generated an estimated proba-
bility of death and expected length of stay for
every discharge. These probabilities were
summed over a hospital’s discharges to yield
an estimate of the number of deaths ‘‘ex-
pected’’ for that hospital as well as the
expected length of stay. Expected length of
stay for a hospital was obtained by calculat-
ing the geometric mean of expected length of
stay for all patients at a hospital for a given
year (but patients with natural log of actual
LOS four standard deviations above the
mean were excluded). A mortality ratio
greater than 1 indicates that the actual
number of deaths exceeds the expected
number, while a mortality ratio less than 1
indicates that the actual number of deaths
was less than expected. Length of stay ratios
are interpreted similarly.
Staffing measures. Registered nurse staffing
was measured as the number of registered
nurse full-time equivalents per 1,000 inpatient
days. Licensed practical nurse and non-nurse
staffing were defined similarly. We addressed
the problem of the AHA data not distinguish-
ing nurse staffing for inpatient and outpatient
services by following Kovner and Gergen
(1988; Kovner et al. 2002) in allocating staffing
to the inpatient facility based on the ratio of
inpatient to outpatient gross revenues. In
addition, we used the OSCAR files to provide
supplemental information on nurse staffing.
Table 1. Variable definitions and sources of data
Variable Definition Sources
Quality measures
Mortality ratio Observed mortalities/expected mortalities HCUP, Medstat
Length of stay (LOS) ratio Mean of LOS/mean of expected LOS HCUP, Medstat
Hospital characteristics
Ownership FP or NFP AHA survey
Case-mix index (CMI) Complexity of Medicare cases treated CMS
Staffing measures
RN staffing RN FTEs/1,000 inpatient days AHA, OSCAR
CMI-adjusted RN staffing RN FTEs/(CMI 3 1,000 inpatient days) AHA, OSCAR, CMS
Market characteristics
Number of HMOs Number of HMOs in the hospital service
area (HSA)
Wholey et al. (1997)/
InterStudy
HMO penetration HMO enrollment as % of total HSA
population
Wholey et al. (1997)/
InterStudy
Herfindahl index Sum of squared market share in an HSA AHA survey




Indicator variable for hospitals
located in MSA
AHA
Per capita income Income/population (thousands of 1995 $) Area Resource Files
Unemployment rate Unemployment rate in HSA (%) Area Resource Files
Percentage elderly HSA population $ 65 years old (%) Area Resource Files
Insurance coverage
percentages
Percent patients in HSA with primary
payer private insurer (including
HMO), Medicare, Medicaid, or self-pay
HCUP
Population HSA population (in thousands) Area Resource Files
Notes: HCUP 5 Healthcare Cost and Utilization Project National Inpatient Sample; AHA survey 5 American Hospital
Association Annual Survey; CMS 5 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; OSCAR 5 CMS Online Survey
Certification and Reporting system.
Nurse Staffing
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Table 2. Percentile values in 1990 and 1995, by ownership status
Percentile values 1990 Percentile values 1995
25th 50th 75th 25th 50th 75th
Outcome measures
Mortality ratio
NFP 1.53 1.73 1.97 1.27 1.49 1.72
FP 1.31 1.58 1.76 1.10 1.33 1.55
LOS ratio
NFP .89 .97 1.05 .67 .72 .78
FP .87 .93 .98 .64 .69 .74
Hospital characteristic
CMI
NFP 1.13 1.24 1.36 1.19 1.30 1.50
FP 1.25 1.30 1.37 1.30 1.39 1.48
Staffing measures
RN staffing
NFP 2.53 3.00 3.64 2.94 3.57 4.33
FP 1.99 2.82 3.82 2.71 3.34 4.00
CMI-adjusted RN staffing
NFP 2.01 2.36 2.86 2.19 2.65 3.14
FP 1.63 2.14 2.94 2.01 2.30 2.75
Market characteristics
HMO penetration
NFP 5.04 13.39 21.54 11.59 21.80 33.51
FP 3.40 16.79 16.84 12.41 22.72 33.51
Number of HMOs
NFP 2.00 5.47 9.75 3.44 7.58 12.15
FP 2.35 9.56 15.47 4.61 8.45 14.00
Herfindahl index
NFP 4.88 16.66 26.07 5.00 17.04 27.37
FP 3.51 5.35 16.56 3.33 6.24 18.26
Inpatient days per 1,000 population
NFP 738 930 1,073 581 756 948
FP 743 845 1,050 581 725 841
Population characteristics
Per capita income
NFP 14.86 17.25 19.47 16.32 19.34 20.89
FP 16.56 19.47 20.84 18.14 19.94 20.89
Unemployment rate
NFP 4.63 5.36 6.39 3.90 5.19 6.70
FP 5.12 6.13 6.33 4.36 6.56 7.23
Percent elderly
NFP 11.77 13.91 16.51 12.11 13.90 16.23
FP 11.58 16.51 21.48 12.46 16.11 21.22
Percent private insurance
NFP 38.04 43.87 50.63 36.01 41.65 46.35
FP 35.02 38.04 42.71 35.76 38.56 39.77
Percent Medicare
NFP 22.55 27.15 31.91 23.46 30.06 36.31
FP 20.48 29.84 32.40 22.57 27.64 37.01
Percent Medicaid
NFP 11.26 14.80 18.60 12.67 17.60 23.12
FP 11.85 14.57 18.57 15.97 19.60 21.79
Percent self-pay
NFP 0.00 3.43 6.47 3.11 4.74 7.32
FP 0.00 0.00 1.86 4.22 5.92 7.89
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Market measures. We used the hospital
service areas (HSAs) that were developed by
Makuc et al. (1991) and which group counties
into geographic regions based on flows of
inpatient hospital admissions. By definition,
each HSA includes at least one hospital.
Wholey et al. (1997) suggest that since over-
or under-allocation pro-rating errors tend to
be offset within a limited geographical area
(over-allocation/under-allocation patterns oc-
cur in adjacent counties), aggregating to HSA
or metropolitan statistical area (MSA) levels
will produce more reliable measures of HMO
penetration. We therefore measured market
characteristics (number of HMOs, Herfindahl
index, inpatient days per 1,000 population) at
the HSA level.
Population characteristics. Given the find-
ings that some of the significant differences in
FPs and NFPs disappeared when controlling
for geographic location (Seago, Spetz, and
Mitchell 2004), and the propensity of FP
hospitals’ to locate in geographically favor-
able areas (Norton and Staiger 1994; Sloan et
al. 2003), we included several population
characteristics that might affect health and
health needs in the HSA. These include: per
capita income, unemployment rate, percent-
age elderly, insurance status (percentage of
patients with primary payer private insur-
ance, including HMO, Medicare, Medicaid,
and self-pay), and total HSA population
(McCue 1997; Mark 1999; Rosko 2001;
Thorpe, Florence, and Seiber 2000).
Results
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the
hospitals by ownership status in our sample
in 1990 and 1995. Note that the 25th, 50th,
and 75th percentile values for mortality ratio
and LOS ratio at FP hospitals are uniformly
lower (indicating higher quality of care) than
at NFP hospitals. In addition, FP staffing is
always lower except for the 75th percentile in
1990.
The nub of the puzzle that we explore is
described in Figures 1 to 3. The top half of
Figure 1 contains kernel density estimates of
RN staffing levels at FP and NFP hospitals in
our sample for the year 1995. (Each of the
other years in our sample, 1990–1994, gen-
erates similar pictures.) Except for hospitals
at the very lowest level of staffing (fewer than
1.5 RN FTEs per 1,000 inpatient days), the
distribution of staffing levels for FP hospitals
is located left (indicating lower staffing levels)
of the distribution for NFP hospitals. How-
ever, this difference is not statistically signif-
icant using either the Kolmogorov-Smirnov
or Epps-Singleton tests (Table 3). The bot-
tom half of Figure 1 shows that the difference
in RN staffing distributions between FP and
NFP hospitals is more pronounced when we
compare staffing levels after adjusting for
differences in case-mix index. With the case-
mix adjustment, as indicated in Table 3, the
difference is statistically significant using
either the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (p5.031) or
the Epps-Singleton test (p5.037).
The top half of Figure 2, which provides
the kernel density estimates of the mortality
ratio (actual in-hospital mortalities divided
by expected mortalities), shows that the
distribution of mortality ratios at FP hospi-
tals lies to the left (lower mortality ratio) of
that for NFP hospitals. Put another way, FP
mortality ratios nearly ‘‘dominate’’ those at
NFP hospitals in that, with the exception of
Percentile values 1990 Percentile values 1995
25th 50th 75th 25th 50th 75th
Population (000s)
NFP 256 548 2,068 278 597 2,180
FP 521 1,870 3,271 593 1,819 3,525






the five smallest NFP mortality ratio obser-
vations, the cumulative distribution of out-
comes for FP hospitals lies to the left of the
cumulative distribution for NFP hospitals. As
indicated in Table 3, this difference is statis-
tically significant using either the Kolmo-
gorov-Smirnov (p5.012) or the Epps-Single-
ton test (p5.022).
The top half of Figure 3 provides the
kernel density estimates for the LOS ratio
(the geometric mean of actual length of stay
divided by the geometric mean of expected
length of stay). Here, the distribution of
outcomes for FP hospitals dominates that
for NFP hospitals in that the cumulative
distribution of LOS ratios for FPs lies to the
left of the cumulative distribution for NFP
hospitals, and again the difference is statisti-
cally significant.
Consistent with research cited earlier dem-
onstrating the importance of population and
market characteristics in the location of FP
hospitals, differences in the distribution of
quality of care between FP and NFP hospitals
Figure 1. Kernel density estimates of RN staffing levels in 1995, by ownership status
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are not as simple as the top halves of Figures 2
and 3 would suggest. It is straightforward to
show that these differences in the distributions
of outcomes are in part attributable to
population and market characteristics—that
is, differences in where FP hospitals are
located, rather than any variable specifically
under the control of the hospitals. To demon-
strate, we estimated a model for mortality
ratio and LOS ratio with regressors reflecting
population and market characteristics. For
example, for the mortality ratio we have:
Mortality Ratioi ~ b0 z b1MSAi
z b2 ln(Populationi) z b3Olderi
z b4Unemployment Ratei z b5ln(HSA Hospital Usei)
z b6ln(Per Capita Incomei) z b7ln(HSA Hospital Usei)
| ln(Per Capita Incomei)z b8Herfindahl Indexi
z b9Percent Private z b10Percent Medicare
z b11Percent Medicaid z b12Percent Self -Pay
z b13HMO Penetrationi z b14Number of HMOsi
z b15HMO Penetrationi | Number of HMOsi z ui
Figure 2. Kernel density estimates of the mortality ratio and adjusted mortality ratio in




where the variables are defined as in Table 1,
ln indicates natural log, and ui is the random
error term for hospital i.4 To obtain a measure
of quality of care adjusted for differences in
population and market characteristics, we
calculated the predicted value at the mean
value of each of the variables and added back
in ûi, the residual for hospital i.
Figure 3. Kernel density estimates of the LOS ratio and adjusted LOS ratio in 1995, by
ownership status
Adj: Mortality Ratioi ~ b̂0 z b̂1MSA
z b̂2ln(Population) z b̂3Older
z b̂4Unemployment Rate z b̂5ln(HSA Hospital Use)
z b̂6ln(Per Capita Income) z b̂7ln(HSA Hospital Use)
| ln (Per Capita Income) z b̂8Herfindahl Index
z b̂9Percent Private z b̂10Percent Medicare
z b̂11Percent Medicaid z b̂12Percent Self -Pay
z b̂13HMO Penetration z b̂14Number of HMOs
z b̂15HMO Penetration| Number of HMOs z ûi
(2)
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Thus, we control for immediately observable
differences in population and market charac-
teristics. But by no means do we claim to
adjust for all differences potentially affecting
quality of care (e.g., potential differences in
patient populations remaining even after
Medstat risk adjustment). (Results of these
regressions are in Table 4.) We specifically do
not include any hospital-level variables in
equation 1; our intent is not to estimate a fully
formed parametric model of quality of care,
but rather to show that simply controlling for
where FP hospitals are located largely resolves
the puzzle/anomaly represented by Figure 1
and the top halves of Figures 2 and 3.
The graph in the bottom half of Figure 2
shows the kernel density estimates for the
adjusted mortality rates for FP and NFP
hospitals. Although the distribution for FP
hospitals is still left of the distribution for NFP
hospitals, a good deal of the disparity in the
distributions evident in the top half of Figure 2
is eliminated by controlling for population and
market characteristics; there is no statistically
significant difference in the distributions (Ta-
ble 3). As shown in the bottom half of
Figure 3, the distributions of adjusted LOS
ratio for FP and NFP hospitals are also more
similar compared to the distributions of the
LOS ratio. Again, the two tests for distribu-
tions (Table 3) confirm the conclusion con-
veyed by the bottom half of Figure 2 that these
differences are not statistically significant.
We next present information showing how
FP and NFP distributions of staffing and
outcomes changed between 1990 and 1995. To
present this information in a compact way and
to emphasize differences between FP and NFP
distributions, we present figures showing the
differences in the FP and NFP kernel density
estimates in 1990 and in 1995. The top half of
Figure 4 shows the difference in kernel density
estimates for RN staffing in 1990 (solid line)
and 1995 (dashed line). The line for 1995 can be
compared to the top half of Figure 1: at a given
value of RN staffing, the dashed line in the top
half of Figure 4 shows the distance between the
FP and NFP density estimates that we
displayed in the top half of Figure 1.5 When
the FP density estimate in Figure 1 lies above
the NFP density estimate, then the dashed line
in Figure 4 lies above zero. Note that the more
similar the FP and NFP density estimates are
in Figure 1, the closer the difference in density
lines are to zero. Hence, one can see that the
1995 FP and NFP densities are much more
similar at RN staffing levels above the medians
(3.57 at NFP hospitals, 3.34 at FP hospitals)
than below the medians.
The difference in density figures allows us
to compare both how FP and NFP hospitals
differed from each other and any change in







RN staffing .184 .155 6.11 .191
CMI-adjusted RN staffing .235 .031 10.19 .037
Mortality ratio .261 .012 11.43 .022
Adjusted for population and market characteristics .142 .435 3.29 .510
LOS ratio .216 .059 10.29 .036
Adjusted for population and market characteristics .188 .139 3.86 .425
1990
RN staffing .240 .018 12.86 .012
CMI-adjusted RN staffing .284 .003 16.90 .002
Mortality ratio .252 .011 13.68 .008
Adjusted for population and market characteristics .176 .160 7.92 .094
LOS ratio .254 .010 14.85 .005
Adjusted for population and market characteristics .239 .019 8.57 .073
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those differences from 1990 to 1995. First, FP
and NFP distributions of both RN staffing
and case mix-adjusted RN staffing shifted to
the right (higher staffing levels) in 1995
compared to 1990; note, for example, how
the difference in density ‘‘hump’’ for case
mix-adjusted RN staffing lies at 2 in 1995, but
at approximately 1.5 in 1990. (This shift right
in the distribution is also indicated in the
percentile values shown in Table 2.) Note
that Figure 4 also suggests that the distribu-
tions of staffing become somewhat more
similar in 1995 compared to 1990—the
relatively large downward hump that occurs
at staffing levels slightly below 2 to slightly
above 3 in 1990 ameliorates considerably in
1995. This visual impression is confirmed by
comparing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov and
Epps-Singleton test statistics for 1990 and
1995 (Table 3). The test statistics for case-mix
index (CMI)-adjusted RN staffing are much
larger for 1990, and the test statistics indicate
a statistically significant difference in RN
staffing in 1990, unlike in 1995.
Figure 5 provides more stark visual evi-
dence of differences in densities. We draw the
figure keeping the scale the same for the
difference in mortality ratio density estimates
(top half) and the difference in LOS ratio
density estimates (bottom half). With the
same scale, it is easy to see that differences in
density estimates between FP and NFP
hospitals are much larger for the LOS ratio
than for the mortality ratio in both 1990 and
1995. Further, changes in the difference in
density estimates between 1990 and 1995 are
immediately apparent for the LOS ratio.
While there is little difference in the magni-
tude of the differences in densities for the
mortality ratio in 1990 versus 1995, the
magnitude of the difference in densities
for the LOS ratio in 1990 and 1995 is quite
large. Thus, the difference in LOS ratio was
much larger in 1990 than in 1995. Hence,
while there is evidence of differences in the
distribution of LOS ratios between FP and
NFP hospitals in 1995, Figure 5 shows that
the differences in 1990 were much larger. This
is confirmed in the significance tests for the
difference in distributions reported in Ta-
ble 3. Both test statistics for the LOS ratio are
considerably larger in 1990 than in 1995; the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test indicates a statisti-
cally significant difference in the FP and NFP
distributions in 1990 even after adjusting for
population and market characteristics, but
the Epps-Singleton test does not provide
strong evidence of such a difference.
Table 4. Regression results for equation 1 for mortality ratio and LOS ratio, 1995
Variable Mortality ratio LOS ratio
MSA 2.018 (.059) 2.007 (.017)
ln(Population) 2.110** (.040) 2.015 (.010)
Percent elderly 2.007 (.006) 2.005** (.002)
Unemployment rate .008 (.011) .004 (.003)
ln(IPDs per 1,000 population) 21.116 (.898) 21.038*** (.249)
ln(Per capita income) 22.446 (2.033) 22.367*** (.564)
ln(IPDs per 1,000 population)3 ln(Per capita income) .400 (.303) .380*** (.084)
Herfindahl index .001 (.003) .000 (.001)
HMO penetration .003 (.003) 2.000 (.001)
Number of HMOs .006 (.008) 2.000 (.002)
HMO penetration 3 Number of HMOs .000 (.000) .000 (.000)
Percent Medicare 2.012 (.010) .005 (.003)
Percent Medicaid 2.013 (.011) .005 (.003)
Percent private insurance 2.010 (.010) .006* (.003)
Percent self-pay 2.015 (.010) .009*** (.003)
Constant 10.669 (6.250) 6.918*** (1.729)
R-squared .142 .325
Number of observations 310 310




Inquiry/Volume 44, Summer 2007
180
In summary, we investigated whether nurse
staffing, mortality, and length of stay would
differ in FP and NFP hospitals. We found
that FP hospitals used significantly fewer RN
FTEs/1,000 case mix-adjusted days. We also
found that both mortality ratios and length of
stay ratios were significantly lower in FP
hospitals; however, the mortality ratio and
length of stay differences were no longer
statistically significant when population and
market characteristics were controlled. Final-
ly, we found that from 1990 to 1995, FP and
NFP RN staffing distributions became some-
what more similar, while the FP and NFP
LOS ratios became much more similar.
However, we did not observe distinct changes
in the difference between FP and NFP
mortality ratio densities.
Discussion
We hypothesized that FP hospitals would
have lower levels of nurse staffing than NFPs.
Our results suggest that case mix-adjusted
Figure 4. Difference in kernel density estimates of RN staffing levels for for-profit and not-
for-profit hospitals in 1990 and 1995
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RN staffing levels are lower in FPs than in
NFPs. We also found a superior distribution
of outcomes (mortality and length of stay)
obtained with a lower level of RN staffing–
but we also showed that controlling for
population characteristics largely eliminates
these differences. Interestingly, as Table 2
indicates, FPs’ case-mix index was higher
than NFPs. Perhaps this demonstrates their
greater success in coding optimization and/or
an income-seeking marketing strategy target-
ing patients with selected diagnostic entities
such as heart surgery that, while complex,
also maximize reimbursement behaviors that
have been called ‘‘cream skimming’’ (Sloan et
al. 2001).
Given the presence of a ‘‘residual claimant’’
at FP hospitals, one might expect that
managerial structures and characteristics,
safety climate, and investment in information
systems to support the provision of clinical
care might lead to more efficient deployment
Figure 5. Difference in kernel density estimates of mortality and LOS ratios for for-profit
and not-for-profit hospitals in 1990 and 1995
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and utilization of nurses in FP hospitals,
contributing to a better distribution of out-
comes produced with fewer nurses. Future
studies that include primary data on these
organizational variables, the qualifications
(education, experience) of the nursing staff,
and other key variables (such as work
complexity, patient census volatility, and
nursing staff turnover) might provide addi-
tional insight about how the production
technology of caring for patients differs by
ownership type.
The reduction of differences that we found
from 1990 to 1995 in the density distributions
of staffing and the LOS ratio may reflect the
dramatic changes in the operating environ-
ment for acute care hospitals—both FP and
NFP—due to the increasing dominance of
managed care in the early to mid-1990s.
NFPs may have responded to increased
competitive pressures by behaving more like
their FP counterparts, implementing strategic
initiatives aimed at improving the efficiency
of their internal operations. Such initiatives
have included reductions in volume and mix
of services, in bed capacity, and in length of
stay, and changes in the intensity of services
provided. Staffing also was affected by
implementing re-engineering and re-design
strategies that frequently involved reductions
in nursing staff (ANA 1995). Thus, our
findings provide some support for Pauly
and Redisch’s (1973) argument that NFPs
indeed may be ‘‘for-profits in disguise,’’ at
least in the challenging times that existed
during the period of our study.
We began by asking whether FPs and
NFPs differed in their RN staffing, mortality,
and length of stay. We found that case mix-
adjusted RN staffing was significantly lower
in FPs than in NFPs, and that, after
controlling for population and market char-
acteristics, there were no statistically signifi-
cant differences in mortality or length of stay
based on ownership type. We also found,
however, that FPs and NFPs became more
similar over time in terms of the distribution
of RN staffing and the distribution of the
LOS ratio. One limitation of our study is that
the data and model are not sufficiently rich to
determine whether different production func-
tions exist across ownership types for trans-
forming inputs (i.e., staffing) into quality
outputs (mortality, length of stay). Future
research examining these transformation pro-
cesses—specifically how the nursing care
process differs at FPs from NFPs—may
reveal important dissimilarities in fundamen-
tal organizational processes, such as decision
making and collaborative inter-professional
relationships that may favor the production
of quality at lower staffing levels. In addition,
quality of care encompasses a larger set of
outcomes than we were able to observe.
Future research should consider other out-
comes measures such as the development of
in-hospital complications and the occurrence
of selected adverse events. More positive
outcomes, such as patients’ readiness for
discharge and understanding of their illness
and coordination of care across settings,
while rarely studied, are also important.
While our study examined differences in
staffing and quality of care in FP and NFP
hospitals using data from 1990 and 1995, the
issues continue to be relevant today. In the
early to mid-1990s, hospitals faced a major
upheaval in the health care market due to the
rapid expansion of managed care penetration.
Today, although the pace of managed care
penetration has slowed, hospitals now are
faced with a new upheaval: the ‘‘quality
revolution.’’ The CMS Hospital Quality
Initiative is using multiple strategies to impel
hospitals to provide superior quality of care
(CMS 2006). These strategies include: regu-
lation and enforcement activities to assure
that Medicare hospitals comply with federal
standards for patient health and safety; pro-
viding readily available and easily interpret-
able information for patients on the CMS
Hospital Compare Web site; and rewarding
superior performance through pay-for-per-
formance, in which hospitals in the top 20%
of quality performance earn a financial bo-
nus.
Quality of hospital care increasingly is
being recognized as dependent upon the
adequacy of nurse staffing, a factor reflected
in the bellwether enactment in 2004 of
minimum nurse staffing legislation in Cali-
fornia, and the introduction of nurse staffing
legislation in more than 18 other states. Thus,
hospitals’ nurse staffing contributes directly
Nurse Staffing
183
to their ability to compete successfully in the
new quality race. Given these external pres-
sures on both FP and NFP hospitals, we are
likely to observe further convergence in nurse
staffing and quality in FP and NFP hospitals,
a question to be addressed empirically in the
future. Comparative research in FP and NFP
hospitals focusing on the impact of ownership
on clinical micro-systems, staffing decisions,
and the organization and delivery of nursing
care would enhance understanding of the
mechanisms underlying the nurse staffing-
quality relationship. Knowledge from this
research can contribute to the development of
health care policy and organizational strate-
gies that will constructively support the
deployment of an increasingly scarce regis-
tered nurse workforce.
Notes
1 See particularly Hartz et al. 1989; Al-Haider
and Wan 1991; Keeler et al. 1992; Shortell and
Hughes 1988; Sloan et al. 2001. One systematic
review of the literature focused specifically on
studies of hospital mortality published
through 2001. Based on 14 studies, the meta-
analysis found that private FPs were associat-
ed with an increased risk of in-hospital
mortality (Devereaux et al. 2002)
2 Given the omnibus nature of these tests,
results concerning the power of the tests vary
with the nature of the distributions compared.
An example is the Monte Carlo simulations by
Epps and Singleton (1986). Given a Type I
error fixed at .05 and sample sizes of 50 drawn
from two distributions, power varies from: a)
100% for both the Epps-Singleton and Kol-
mogorov-Smirnov tests of two uniform dis-
tributions, with the same expected value, but
one with variance 5 2 and the other with
variance 5 4; b) 53% for the Epps-Singleton
test and 6% for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
comparing a uniform distribution with ex-
pected value 5 0, and variance 5 4 with the
standard Cauchy distribution; and c) 4% for
the Epps-Singleton test and 3% for the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test comparing two
normal distributions with variance 5 2.2, but
with one having expected value 5 0 and the
other having expected value 5 1.
3 We also excluded patients who were admitted
from another hospital or another health
facility including a long-term care facility.
4 Given that standard error for the standardized
mortality ratio equals (observed deaths).5/
expected deaths (Breslow and Day 1987), in
estimating the model with the mortality ratio as
the dependent variable, we weighted the data by
the inverse of this standard error. Given that the
LOS ratio was obtained as the ratio of geo-
metric means from hospitals with quite different
numbers of patients, we weighted by the square
root of the number of patients at the hospital.
5 To make the difference in density estimates
easier to read, we smoothed them slightly
using a simple moving average.
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